Security Advisories์ถ์ฒ: GitHub Security Advisories์กฐํ์ 3
[openclaw] OpenClaw: Zalo webhook rate limiting could be bypassed before secret validation
By GitHub2026๋
3์ 14์ผ
**[openclaw] OpenClaw: Zalo webhook rate limiting could be bypassed before secret validation**
Summary The Zalo webhook handler applied request rate limiting only after webhook authentication succeeded. Requests with an invalid secret returned 401 but did not count against the rate limiter, allowing repeated secret guesses without triggering 429. Impact This made brute-force guessing materially easier for weak but policy-compliant webhook secrets. Once the secret was guessed, an attacker could submit forged Zalo webhook traffic. Affected versions openclaw <= 2026.3.11 Patch Fixed in openclaw 2026.3.12...
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**[devsupporter ํด์ค]**
์ด ๊ธฐ์ฌ๋ GitHub Security Advisories์์ ์ ๊ณตํ๋ ์ต์ ๊ฐ๋ฐ ๋ํฅ์ ๋๋ค. ๊ด๋ จ ๋๊ตฌ๋ ๊ธฐ์ ์ ๋ํด ๋ ์์๋ณด์๋ ค๋ฉด ์๋ณธ ๋งํฌ๋ฅผ ์ฐธ๊ณ ํ์ธ์.
Summary The Zalo webhook handler applied request rate limiting only after webhook authentication succeeded. Requests with an invalid secret returned 401 but did not count against the rate limiter, allowing repeated secret guesses without triggering 429. Impact This made brute-force guessing materially easier for weak but policy-compliant webhook secrets. Once the secret was guessed, an attacker could submit forged Zalo webhook traffic. Affected versions openclaw <= 2026.3.11 Patch Fixed in openclaw 2026.3.12...
---
**[devsupporter ํด์ค]**
์ด ๊ธฐ์ฌ๋ GitHub Security Advisories์์ ์ ๊ณตํ๋ ์ต์ ๊ฐ๋ฐ ๋ํฅ์ ๋๋ค. ๊ด๋ จ ๋๊ตฌ๋ ๊ธฐ์ ์ ๋ํด ๋ ์์๋ณด์๋ ค๋ฉด ์๋ณธ ๋งํฌ๋ฅผ ์ฐธ๊ณ ํ์ธ์.
![[openclaw] OpenClaw: Zalo webhook rate limiting could be bypassed before secret validation](/assets/images/github_com_1773619474768.png)